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¿Producirá algún cambio la nueva ley para 




La articulista formula un análisis jurídico sobre la nueva ley firmada el 
16 de diciembre de 2016 por el presidente Barack Obama, titulada Ley 
para la Restitución del Arte Expropiado Durante el Holocausto, una ley 
federal que otorga un plazo de seis años para que, en Estados Unidos, 
las víctimas de la persecución en la era de los nazis y sus herederos 
puedan demandar judicialmente la restitución del arte o propiedad cul-
tural sustraído, confiscado o saqueado como resultado de las políticas 
del Tercer Reich.
PalaBras clave: Ley de 2016 para la Restitución del Arte Expropiado 
Durante el Holocausto, propiedad cultural, arte confiscado, demandas 
de restitución.
AbstRAct
The author of this article presents a legal analysis of the Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (“HEAR Act”), signed into law 
by President Barack Obama on December 16, 2016, which creates a 
uniform, federal six-year statute of limitations on civil restitution claims 
in the United States for the victims of Nazi-era persecution and their 
*   Rachel Sklar pertenece a la Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law de Nueva York. 
Es miembro de la revista jurídica de la misma y miembro activo de la Asociación de 
Derecho del Arte. Obtuvo la licenciatura en Historia del arte y en Letras españolas por 
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heirs to make a legal demand for the return of artwork or other cultural 
property that was seized, confiscated or wrongfully taken as a result of 
the policies of the Third Reich.
keyWords: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, cultu-
ral property, confiscated art, restitution claims.
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During times of war, works of art in private collections and museums 
have tragically been looted and sometimes destroyed by enemy comba-
tants. During World War II, the displacement of art was unprecedented, 
and for the first time in modern history combatant forces had within their 
ranks highly trained art specialists whose “duty it was to secure and 
preserve movable works of art, and whose professionalism” saved many 
works from complete destruction.1 Never before had there been such a 
massive amount of art systematically pillaged from so many countries 
during wartime.2 It is estimated that the scale of looted European art du-
ring the Nazi period exceeded that of all the Napoleonic Wars combined.3 
The Nazi regime’s purpose in looting works of art was two-fold: to “pro-
mote (and return to Germany) what in their view were examples of supe-
rior art and culture” and to eradicate the Jewish people by annihilating 
their culture as part of the “Final Solution”.4 As a result, the Nazis’ efforts 
to confiscate works of art reached a historically unparalleled level.5
The Nazi regime’s policy of excluding Jews from the German economy 
(Entjudung der Wirtschaft) required a clear legal framework to be effec-
tive.6 Potential buyers were reluctant to buy or invest in Jewish-owned 
property without obtaining secure legal title to businesses and real or 
personal property.7 As a result, the Nazi regime created an entirely new 
legal mechanism to enable the comprehensive confiscation of Jewish-
owned property by the German state.
During the Third Reich, it is estimated that the Nazis stole hundreds 
of thousands of works of art from private collections and museums 
throughout Europe, in what has been termed the “greatest displace-
1  Sue Choi, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After the Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 26 nW. J. Int’l l. & Bus. 167 (2005).
2  Stephanie Cuba, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on 
Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 cardozo arts & ent. l.J. 447, 470 (1999).
3  hector felIcIano, the lost museum: the nazI consPIracy to steal the World’s greatest 
Works of art 23 (1997); see also Choi, supra note 1, at 167.
4  Choi, supra note 1, at 168.
5  Shira T. Shapiro, How Republic of Austria v. Altmann and United States v. Portrait of 
Wally Relay the Past and Forecast the Future of Nazi Looted-Art Restitution Litigation, 
34 Wm. mItchell l. rev. 1147, 1150 (2008).
6  martIn dean, roBBIng the JeWs: the confIscatIon of JeWIsh ProPerty In the holocaust, 
1933-1945, 258 (2008).
7  Id.
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ment of art in human history”.8 An estimated $2.5 billion dollars of art, 
stated in 1945 prices, was plundered by the Nazis and used to help 
finance the war.9 That is the equivalent of $20.5 billion dollars today.10 
Originally, works of art were taken by the Nazis to fund the war effort, 
but the seizure of works of art from private Jewish collections was part 
of an unprecedented process of persecution, dehumanization and even-
tual annihilation.11
Over the past 70 years, Holocaust survivors and their families have 
tirelessly attempted to reclaim property and the cultural, traditional, 
and historical works of art which were systematically removed from their 
homes and businesses. Many Holocaust survivors and their heirs in the 
United States have filed legitimate claims to recover their rightful pro-
perty only to be denied relief after years of litigation, owing to the fact 
that the United States did not establish an office of independent coun-
sel to review Nazi-era restitution claims, and the United States’ legal 
system lacked the means to advance legitimate claims by setting aside 
certain time-based procedural defenses. The United States government 
has twice affirmed its commitment to just and fair solutions but failed to 
enact a system that would lead to just and fair outcomes.12 But a com-
mitment to a solution is not tantamount to restitution.
The United States Congress has again reaffirmed its commitment to 
the victims of the Holocaust by recently enacting federal legislation that 
creates a six-year limitations period for restitution actions with the en-
actment of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (the 
“HEAR Act”).13 The legislation is an attempt at ensuring the kind of justi-
ce that only Congress has the ability to provide.
8  See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 957 (9th 
Cir. 2010).
9  Jessica Mullery, Fulfilling the Washington Principles: A Proposal for Arbitration Panels 
to Resolve Holocaust-Era Art Claims, 11 cardozo J. conflIct resol. 643, 647 (2010).
10  Id.
11  Cuba, supra note 2, at 470.
12  Erica Wolf, The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 
at Pasadena: The Invocation of the Act of State Doctrine and its Implications for Future 
Nazi-Stolen Art Claims, 34 cardozo arts & ent. l.J. 525, 531 (2016).
13  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2016). The House of Representatives passed H.R. 6130 by a voice vote on December 
7, 2016, the bill then passed the Senate by a voice vote as S. 2763 on December 10, 
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The purpose of the HEAR Act is to strengthen current law in order to 
help victims of the Holocaust and their heirs achieve justice. The histori-
cally weak laws for Holocaust victims in obtaining justice are due in part 
to the failure to implement the Washington Conference principles and 
the self-regulating guidelines of the American Alliance of Museums14 
and the Association of Art Museum Directors for claims for restitution 
of Nazi-era looted art. The museums and the American judicial system 
have systematically and overwhelming denied Holocaust victims’ claims 
for restitution of looted art based on procedural defenses rather than 
on the legal merits. The HEAR Act is a delayed congressional response 
to Nazi-era looted art restitution claims and an attempt to bolster such 
claims by applying equitable principles.
How the American judicial system has failed Holocaust victims and 
their heirs is exemplified by the protracted litigation in the case Von 
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena.15 In Von Saher, the 
trial and appellate courts unfairly discounted the claimant’s arguments 
and deferred to the museum’s procedural defenses, thereby denying 
the claimant a just and fair solution.16
This Note advocates that Congress amend the recently enacted HEAR 
Act so that the legislation ensures and preserves the rights of present 
and future claimants to seek restitution of Nazi-era looted art.17 Part I 
summarizes the purpose and effect of the Washington Conference held 
in 1998. Part I explains the importance of provenance research, and de-
tails why the United States adopted a self-regulating system for claims 
for restitution of Nazi-era looted art. Part I concludes with a brief expla-
nation of Civil Law. Part II briefly describes the procedural history of the 
2016. The HEAR Act was presented to President Obama on December 15 and signed by 
President Obama on December 16, 2016, becoming Public Law No. 114-308.
14  The American Alliance of Museums was formerly known as the American Association 
of Museums.
15  Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“Von Saher I”); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 
F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Von Saher II”), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 1158 (2015).
16  Washington Conference principle VIII states, in part: “[S]teps should be taken expedi-
tiously to a just and fair solution” for claims involving art that has not been restituted if 
the owners or their heirs can be identified.
17  Id.
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United States District Court for the Central District of California decision 
in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena.18 Part II con-
cludes by explaining how in Von Saher, the trial court unfairly discounted 
the claimant’s arguments and deferred to the museum’s procedural de-
fenses, thereby denying the claimant a “just and fair” solution. Part III 
examines the background and procedural history of the HEAR Act. Part 
III concludes by discussing the merits of the HEAR Act and the applicabi-
lity of equitable principles. Part IV explains the importance of Congress’s 
involvement due to Von Saher, and the new national standard created 
by the HEAR Act. Part IV continues by examining the options available to 
Congress and its decision to adopt language in accord with New York’s 
“Demand and Refusal Rule”. Finally, Part IV concludes with the practical 
argument that none of the policy goals of state statutes of limitations 
have previously been met in Nazi-era looted art restitution cases. Lastly, 
Part V offers three proposed amendments to the HEAR Act to provide a 
greater measure of certainty that meritorious claims will be heard.
1. Background
The first months of Nazi Party rule were marked by considerable violen-
ce throughout Germany.19 The Nazi regime systematically constructed 
a separate and well-organized plan for the confiscation of Jewish and 
occupied-territory art.20 The official Nazi art confiscation service, known 
as Einsatzstab Reichsleiters Rosenberg (ERR), was formed with the goal 
of creating the “largest private art collection in Europe”21 by performing 
the systematic plunder of museums and libraries and the confiscation of 
more than 22,000 objects of art.22 The ERR operated throughout Wes-
tern Europe, not only seizing archives and libraries but also providing the 
18  See Order at 1, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-
02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016), ECF No. 331.
19  Dean, supra note 6, at 21.
20  Id.
21  Mullery, supra note 9, at 645.
22  Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and Should Be Done, 20 cardozo L. Rev. 
657 (1999).
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infrastructure for the massive removal of Jewish-owned property.23 The 
Nazi regime was able to confiscate works of art due to some 400 anti-
Jewish measures24 that allowed for a massive and well-coordinated con-
fiscation of Jewish-owned property.25 The widespread participation by the 
local population as beneficiaries of Jewish-owned personal property and 
real estate encouraged by the Nazi Party also engendered acceptance of 
the Nazis’ measures against the Jews beyond a small circle of initial per-
petrators.26 The Nazis were able to manipulate the taking of property in 
order to mobilize society into supporting radical policies to a much grea-
ter extent than the spread of anti-Semitism alone would have supported.
By 1937, the Nazi regime had authorized a commission to confiscate 
“degenerate art” from all major state-owned German museums, which 
resulted in the removal of some 16,000 paintings, drawings, prints, and 
sculptures.27 If not authorized for confiscation, such artworks underwent 
“Aryanization” which resulted in the forced sales of such works at redu-
ced prices.28 In 1938, the Nazis began expropriating all property and 
during the remainder of the regime, the plundering of artworks became 
even more determined.29
23  dean, supra note 6, at 259.
24  Id. at 473.
25  See id. at 470 (For instance: Ordinance for the Registration of Jewish Property (1938) 
required Jews to give lists of their property and then “secured” this property in accor-
dance with the dictates of the German economy; Ordinance for the Attachment of the 
Property of the People’s and States’ Enemies (1938) facilitated confiscation of property 
belonging to Jews as well as non-Jewish enemies of the regime; Ordinance for the Em-
ployment of Jewish Property (1938) enabled government authorities to “Aryanize” Jewish 
businesses; Nuremberg Decrees of 1935 defined who was a Jew and deprived these 
individuals of German citizenship and certain civil rights; Ordinance of 1936 forbade 
Jewish art dealers or purveyors of culture from being members of the Reich Chamber 
of Culture (RKK); First Ordinance on the Exclusion of Jews from German Economic Life 
(1938) prohibited Jews from entering theaters, museums or attending cultural events; 
and Suhneleistung (“atonement tax”) (1938) required Jews to pay 20% of their assets 
as a penalty for “inciting” violence during Kristallnacht).
26  See dean, supra note 6, at 15.
27  lucIan J. sImmons, 7 the Permanent court of arBItratIon/Peace Palace PaPers: reso-
lutIon of cultural ProPerty dIsPutes, Provenance and auctIon houses 85, 87 (Kluwer 
Law Int’l 2004); see also Mullery, supra note 9, at 646.
28  Mullery, supra note 9, at 646 (“Aryanization” was the transfer of Jewish property to non-
Jewish owners and included Jewish businesses, houses, and other property, such as art).
29  Cuba, supra note 2, at 472.
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2. Targeted Works of  Art
When a work of art was confiscated, it was cataloged and determined 
as either “pure Nordic German art”, or it was considered “valueless to 
the German people”.30 Painters such as Vermeer, Rembrandt, Van Eyck, 
and Dürer were thought to represent “pure” Northern European art of 
the highest order.31
The most valuable of the expropriated works of art were sent to the 
Galerie Nationale de Jeu de Paume in Paris for review and then syste-
matically inventoried.32 At the Jeu de Paume, these stolen works “were 
divided up and, depending on their quality and desirability, either trans-
ported to Germany or put up for sale.”33 Hitler planned to display the 
“best” European art in a national art museum he intended to build in his 
hometown of Linz, Austria.34 The art museum was to exemplify German 
cultural superiority and be “one of the Reich’s crowning glories”.35
Despite Hitler’s distaste for “degenerate art,” the Nazi high command 
recognized the value of “Judeo-Bolshevist” modern artists such as Pi-
casso, Kandinsky, Chagall, Matisse, Pissarro, and Van Gogh.36 “Dege-
nerate art” referred to art that depicted Jewish subjects, or was critical 
of Germany or contradicted Nazi ideology.37 Beginning in 1937, the Nazi 
regime auctioned off some of these expropriated works at infamous 
“degenerate art” shows that were attended by American, British, and 
30  Id. at 471.
31  Stephan Schlegelmilch, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim Fine Arts Litiga-
tion and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 case W. res. l. rev. 87, 93 
(2000).
32  Choi, supra note 1, at 168.
33  Id.; see also Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution of Cultural Heritage Dis-
putes: Recovery of Art Looted During the Holocaust, 14 WIllamette J. Int’l & dIs. res. 
243, 253 (2006) (“For example: French, Swiss and German dealers who visited the Jeu 
de Paume in Paris to pick through the looted art apparently knew where the artworks had 
come from and the fact that they were illegally acquired”).
34  See generally lynn h. nIcholas, the raPe of euroPa: the fate of euroPe’s treasures 
In the thIrd reIch and the second World War (1994); see also Schlegelmilch, supra 
note 31, at 94.
35  Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1151.
36  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 94.
37  Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1151.
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Belgian collectors.38 Many works were sold at auction and the proceeds 
were then used to acquire more acceptable art.39
3. Expropriation of  Works of  Art
When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Hitler continued to 
issue orders to exploit Jewish wealth and take all property belonging to 
the enemies of the Reich.40 Hitler ordered special troops, Erfassungs-
kommandos, representing commando units staffed with art historians 
and scholars, to accomplish this task.41 The Erfassungskommandos 
pursued the confiscation of objects from Polish and Jewish posses-
sions that were cultural, artistic or of historic value.42 Hitler believed 
that promoting German nationalism required Germany to assert its cul-
tural supremacy.43
The confiscation of property continued until the very end of the war. 
In November 1943, the United States State Department established 
an Interdivisional Committee on Reparations, Restitution, and Property 
Rights.44 Under the policy of external restitution, nations formerly occu-
pied by the German army would provide American authorities with lists 
of property that had been seized from those nations’ citizens, setting 
forth details regarding the location and circumstances of each theft.45 
Based on that information, American authorities would identify the lis-
ted works of art and return them to their countries of origin.46 Under the 
policy of external restitution, each nation was responsible “for restoring 
the externally restituted artworks to their rightful owners”.47
38  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 94.
39  Id. 
40  Cuba, supra note 2, at 472.
41  Id.
42  Id. (“These units of German commandos swept into designated areas and confis-
cated any art they deemed valuable”).
43  Shapiro supra note 5, at 1150.
44  Wolf, supra note 12, at 534.
45  Id. at 535.
46  Id.
47  Id.
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A. The Washington Conference
In December 1998, forty-three countries met in Washington, D.C. for 
the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets.48 The Washington 
Conference was convened to address the continuing issues surrounding 
Holocaust victims’ restitution claims and the protection of cultural pro-
perty stolen and confiscated during World War II.49 The Washington Con-
ference ended with a compromise providing that each country agree to 
implement the conference’s eleven principles50 within their own domes-
tic legal framework by setting non-binding guidelines for the search and 
return of Nazi-confiscated works of art.51 The Washington Conference 
principles are based on two fundamental propositions: “[a]rt museums 
and their collections should not be built with stolen property [and] pas-
sion for art should not displace respect for justice”.52
The Washington Conference principles clearly advocate for alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) and against litigation in order to resolve these 
claims and recommend that nations develop their own ADR mecha-
nisms. Despite this clear espousal of ADR as a means to resolve claims 
and for nations to abide by the principles, the nations that attended 
the Washington Conference have done markedly little to implement any 
ADR mechanisms.53 Particularly notable is the United States’ failure to 
48  Mullery, supra note 9, at 643.
49  Id.
50  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 101. The Washington Conference adopted eleven 
principles. To develop a consensus on non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues 
relating to Nazi-confiscated art, the Conference recognized that among participating 
nations there are differing legal systems and that countries act within the context of 
their own laws. See WashIngton conference PrIncIPles on nazI-confIscated art (1998), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm.
51  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 101; see also Mullery, supra note 9, at 655 (“Rus-
sia, which participated in the Washington Conference, has traditionally manipulated mu-
seums and governments... to provide ironclad guarantees of immunity from seizure if 
museums want to borrow Russian museums’ artworks”).
52  Wolf, supra note 12, at 530-31.
53  Mullery, supra note 9, at 654; see also Washington Conference principle XI.
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employ any ADR mechanism for restitution claims, despite the fact that 
the United States initiated the Washington Conference and was so vigo-
rous in its efforts to promote restitution during the Clinton administra-
tion.54 Republic of Austria v. Altmann55 is a pointed example of lengthy 
and costly litigation being pursued despite the Washington Conference’s 
recommendation that parties to looted art disputes pursue alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.56
B. Provenance Research
Of the eleven Washington Conference principles, an adherence to and 
commitment to comply with provenance research has been the most 
valuable legacy of the conference.57 Many cases fall into a similar fact 
pattern and, as such, useful rules for dealing with these cases can 
and should be made.58 The provenance of an artwork is the historical 
record of its ownership. An ideal provenance history would provide a 
documentary record of owners’ names, dates of ownership, and means 
of transference, inheritance, or sale through a dealer or auction, and 
locations where the work was kept, from the time of its creation by 
the artist until the present day.59 The provenance process involves a 
crosschecking of the piece with lists of artworks that have gaps in pro-
venance and are part of collections that are deemed suspicious in their 
54  Mullery, supra note 9, at 654.
55  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
56  Mullery, supra note 9, at 656.
57  See Washington Conference principle VI.
58  Id.; see also Lynn H. Nicholas, the sPoIls of War: World War II and Its aftermath: the 
loss, reaPPearance, and recovery of cultural ProPerty 47 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) 
(Observing that: “Before we can search for lost objects, we must know what they are and 
determine the exact circumstances of their displacement. We must discover if they were 
confiscated by governments, stolen by individuals, sold willingly or under duress, bartered 
for food, or simply hidden, forgotten, and randomly moved from place to place. Only when 
these problems have been solved can the process of restitution and compensation be un-
dertaken, and then only on a case-by-case basis, in which, inevitably, present-day political 
considerations and the emotional legacy of World War II will be major factors”).
59  Press Release, Dickstein Shapiro LLC, Legal Analysis Concerning Current Approaches 
of United States Museums to Holocaust-Era Art Claims (June 25, 2015) (on file with 
author).
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chain of title due to the history of looting.60 It is after this research pro-
cess that recovery efforts may follow. Provenance research can be an 
exacting and complex practice, further complicated by the length of 
time that has elapsed since the end of World War II. Even in cases whe-
re the claimant has knowledge of the work’s current possessor and the 
location of the disputed artwork, provenance research must be carried 
out to determine whether there is a viable claim.61
C. The Self-Regulating Guidelines of the American Alliance 
of Museums and the Association of American Museum Directors
Some of the countries that attended the Washington Conference have 
set up neutral tribunals to decide Holocaust victims’ restitution claims, 
while others have passed laws directly addressing restitution claims.62 
The United States set up a self-policing system based on museum gui-
delines to decide if Holocaust-era restitution claims are justified or 
should be rejected.63
The participating countries agreed to implement eleven principles 
under which their national museums were to review artworks in their 
collections to determine if they have a Nazi-era provenance. If a work 
of art is determined to have a Nazi-era provenance, the question must 
then be asked if the piece was, in fact, subjected to Nazi confisca-
tion.64 The Washington Conference’s principles call for both museums 
60  Mullery, supra note 9, at 647.
61  Id. at 648.
62  Id. at 655.
63  Emily A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 
51 B.c. l. rev. 473, 501 (2010). In 1990 Congress considered enacting legislation to 
set standards for returning stolen art. Museum directors, however, testified that they 
could better handle the subject themselves, resulting in codes of ethics promulgated 
by the AAM and AAMD. For example, Glenn Lowry, Director of the Museum of Modern 
Art said the following: “I am convinced the [AAMD] task force will provide the kinds of 
guidelines and recommended actions necessary to ensure that America’s museums set 
the standard for ethical behavior in this respect”.
64  davId roWland, have u.s. museums lIved uP to the PromIse of the WashIngton con-
ference? 149 (2008).
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and the survivors or their heirs of the Nazi-era expropriations to resolve 
looted art restitution claims in a just and fair manner.65 The principles 
do not directly target museums; rather, the main focus appears to be 
the claimants’ interest of rightful ownership, not the museums’ bur-
dens of following the principles, such as the financial costs of additional 
provenance research, publicizing stolen art and deaccessioning.66 Mu-
seums in the United States that are members of the American Alliance 
of Museums (AAM)67 and the Association of American Museum Direc-
tors (AAMD) are bound by these guidelines.68 The guidelines call on 
these museums to waive certain available defenses in order to achieve 
equitable and appropriate resolution of looted art restitution claims.69
Despite a commitment to the just and fair resolution of Nazi-era loo-
ted art claims, adherence has been notably ineffective. According to 
recent statistics, museums in the United States have voluntarily retur-
ned only twenty-eight works of art applying these guidelines.70 Further, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s June 2014 
65  Washington Conference principle VIII states, in part: “[S]teps should be taken expedi-
tiously to a fair and just solution” for claims involving art that has not been restituted if 
the owners or their heirs can be identified.
66  Graefe, supra note 63, at 503.
67  Press Release, World Jewish Restitution Organization, Report Concerning Current Ap-
proaches of United States Museums to Holocaust-Era Art Claims (June 25, 2015) (on 
file with author), at 3.
68  Graefe, supra note 63, at 500-07.
69  roWland, supra note 64, at 150. Specifically, the AAM’s guidelines, in part, provide: “If 
a museum determines that an object in its collection was unlawfully appropriated during 
the Nazi-era without subsequent restitution, the museum should seek to resolve the mat-
ter with the claimant in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner. Further, 
when appropriate and reasonably practical, museums should seek methods other than 
litigation (such as mediation) to resolve claims that an object was unlawfully appropriated 
during the Nazi-era without subsequent restitution.” The AAMD’s guidelines, in part, pro-
vide: “If a member museum receives a claim against a work of art in its collection related 
to an illegal confiscation during the Nazi/Word War II-era, it should seek to review such a 
claim promptly and thoroughly. The museum should request evidence of ownership from 
the claimant in order to assist in determining the provenance of the work of art. […] If after 
working with the claimant to determine the provenance, a member museum should deter-
mine that a work of art in its collection was illegally confiscated during the Nazi/World War 
II-era and not restituted, the museum should offer to resolve the manner in an equitable, 
appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner”.
70  See Herrick Feinstein LLP, Resolved Stolen Art Claims, Claims for Art Stolen During 
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decision in Von Saher marked the first invocation of the Washington 
Conference principles in an American judicial decision.71 In citing the 
Washington Conference principles, the Ninth Circuit effectively determi-
ned they constitute the foreign policy of the United States, and private 
claims for restitution of Nazi-looted art, such as those in Von Saher, are 
consistent with that policy.72
D. Civil Law
One of the many problems in the recovery of stolen art is the movement 
of stolen art across state, national and international borders, often re-
sulting in difficult questions of international and domestic choice of law.73
In France, the Civil Code, also known as the Napoleonic Code, was 
first published on March 21, 1804. The Napoleonic Code’s authority 
extended throughout the empire and was enforced in all the countries 
that were under Napoleon’s rule: Italy adopted the Napoleonic Code 
in 1806, Germany in 1810, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1811. In 
1820, the Russian czar and Polish king commissioned new Civil Codes 
based on the Napoleonic Code.74 With the formation of the German em-
pire in 1871, a major process of legal standardization ensued culmina-
ting in the Book of Civil Law (Burgeliches Gesetzbuch).
The Napoleonic Code has its origins in Roman law. In 476 B. C., 
the Twelve Table Law was published in Rome and enforced throughout the 
Roman Empire.75 In Table VI, “Of the Legal Concepts and the Differences 
Between Acquisition and Possession”, Section VI states that it is for-
the Nazi Era and World War II, Including Nazi-Looted Art and Trophy Art, Aug. 6, 2015 
at 37-46.
71  Wolf, supra note 12, at 532.
72  Id.
73  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 102.
74  Jorge marIo magallón IBarra, I InstItucIones de derecho cIvIl 72 (1987).
75  The Roman Empire encompassed present-day Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as parts of 
eastern France, northern Italy, Slovenia, and western Poland. encycloPedIa, http://www.
encyclopedia.com/history/modern-europe/german-history/holy-roman-empire, (lasted vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2017).
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bidden to obtain possession of a thing that was stolen76 Under Roman 
law, legal possession cannot be obtained by violence, secrecy, fraud or 
by duress.77
Article 2230 of the Napoleonic Code states that possession can never 
be obtained by violence, secrecy, fraud or by duress. Possession obtained 
by these means is rendered illegal ab initio (from its inception) and the 
possessor has the obligation to return to the owner the stolen property. 
Moreover, limitations will not run against the legal owner under these cir-
cumstances because possession never existed as it is void ab initio, an 
illegal appropriation.78
After the war, the French government retained or reassigned ownership 
of thousands of the artworks that had passed through the Jeu de Paume 
in Paris. Also, most of the other countries also retained, reassigned or 
returned the stolen art works (e. g., the Netherlands in Von Saher). Howe-
ver, as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, France, Italy, Slovenia, Poland 
and Russia followed the Civil Code, many of these determinations of ow-
nership as a consequence should have been invalidated as a subsequent 
possessor can never obtain or pass legal title in the case when, from the 
inception, the possession was void.
Part II
A. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena
In Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,79 the plain-
tiff, Marei von Saher,80 was the sole heir to the Dutch art dealer Jacques 
Goudstikker. Jacques Goudstikker was the most prominent Jewish art 
76  magallón, IV InstItucIones de derecho cIvIl 177 (1990).
77  Id. at 179.
78  Id. at 185.
79  Von Saher I, 952 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
80  For clarification purposes, when referencing the plaintiff, Marei von Saher, the author 
will use the term “Ms. von Saher”. When referencing the case, the author will use the 
term “Von Saher”.
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dealer in the Netherlands prior to World War II.81 Mr. Goudstikker pur-
chased Adam and Eve in 1931 from the Soviet Union at an auction in 
Berlin.82 Adam and Eve, or “the Cranachs”, compose a diptych by Ger-
man Renaissance painter Lucas Cranach the Elder.83 On one panel Adam 
holds the apple of temptation while, on the other, Eve is cradling an 
apple as a serpent watches her closely. The work is telling the story of the 
moments before the act that will lead to the biblical couple’s expulsion 
from Eden.84 The two oil-on-panel paintings stand more than six feet tall 
and were painted by in 1530.85 In 2006, Adam and Eve were appraised 
at $28.3 million dollars.86 The Norton Simon Museum of Art (Norton Si-
mon Museum), the defendant, contends that the Soviet Union had con-
fiscated the paintings from the aristocratic Stroganoff-Scherbatoff family 
during the 1920s, although Ms. von Saher disputes that argument.87
81  Kaye, supra note 33, at 245.
82  The auction titled “The Stroganoff Collection” was held at the Lepke Auction house 
in Berlin, Germany. Lepke was well known for selling artworks that the Soviet Union had 
confiscated. The Stroganoff family was one of Russia’s foremost noble houses, although 
not all of the auctioned works of art had been part of the famed Stroganoff Collection, 
the Cranachs were among the auctioned works and were purchased in May 1931 by 
Jacques Goudstikker. See Statement of Decision Granting Defendants’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 16, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 
07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 186.
83  Word and Image Martin Luther’s Reformation, the morgan lIBrary and museum, http://
www.themorgan.org/exhibitions/online/word-and-image (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). Lucas 
Cranach was the court painter of the electors of Saxony and neighbor to Martin Luther. Cra-
nach was known as pictor celerrimus, the fastest painter, because of his rapid and prolific 
production. In addition to creating the famous images of Martin Luther, Cranach also pro-
duced portraits of his Reformation colleagues as well as Protestant and Catholic dignitaries. 
84  Carolina Miranda, Court Rules Museum Can Keep Nazi-Looted Adam and Eve 
Masterpieces with a Hidden Past, l.a. tImes (Aug. 22, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.
latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-norton-simon-good-title-cranach-
20160817-snap-story.html.
85  Word and Image Martin Luther’s Reformation, supra note 83. The moment of temp-
tation —the instant of original sin— was an incredibly popular artistic subject in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance. More than thirty paintings of Adam and Eve survive from 
Cranach’s workshop. The Reformation propagated a new understanding of marriage, 
which provided stability, and considered Adam and Eve humanity’s first married couple.
86  Sarah Cascone, Norton Simon Museum’s Appeal Denied in Case of Nazi-Looted Lu-
cas Cranach Paintings, artneWs (April 3, 2015), available at: https://news.artnet.com/
market/norton-simon-appeal-denied-lucas-cranach-284850.
87  Bianca Acquaviva, The Latest in Nazi-Era Restitution Efforts, center for art laW 
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Before fleeing Germany, Mr. Goudstikker was forced to sell much of 
his art collection.88 In 1940, Mr. Goudstikker fled the Netherlands with his 
wife and son.89 On his family’s voyage to America, Mr. Goudstikker fell to 
his death, leaving behind his “Blackbook” which listed his art assets and 
holdings. Adam and Eve spent the years during World War II in Herman 
Göring’s possession.90
During the liberation of Germany in 1945, Allied Forces discovered 
Adam and Eve and approximately 200 other artworks looted by Göering 
and taken to Germany and sent the artworks to the Munich Central Co-
llecting Point.91 These stolen artworks were returned to the Netherlands 
to be held in trust by the Dutch government for their lawful owners.92 
The Netherlands later made the ownership determinations,93 pursuant 
to the established policy of the Allies, which flowed from the 1943 Lon-
don Declaration.94
Blog (Mar. 24, 2016), https://itsartlaw.com/2016/03/24/the-latest-in-nazi-era-resti-
tution-efforts/.
88  Leila Amineddoleh, The Norton Simon Museum’s Multi-Million-Dollar Nazi Restitu-
tion Case of Two Paintings by Cranach the Elder, Explained, artsy Blog (Apr. 5, 2016, 




90  Amineddoleh, supra note 88; see generally Larger Than Life the Infamous Herman 
Göering, History Net http://www.historynet.com/larger-than-life-the-infamous-hermann-gor 
ing.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2016). Göering was Hitler’s most important and powerful 
deputy. Göering founded the Gestapo in 1933, and was the highest-ranking Nazi Party 
official tried at Nuremberg.
91  Kaye, supra note 33, at 247.
92  Id.
93  Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at 959.
94  Kaye, supra note 33, at 248. On January 5, 1943, the Allies, including the Nether-
lands, issued the “Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in 
Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control” (now commonly known as the “London 
Declaration”). The Declaration warned that the Allies reserved “all their rights to declare 
invalid any transfers of or dealings with, property, rights and interests of any description 
whatsoever… whether such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting 
or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form even when they purport to be vol-
untarily effected.” Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in 
Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control (Jan. 5, 1943), available at http://www.
lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration.
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In 1961, George Stroganoff-Scherbatoff came forward and alleged 
that the Soviet government had illegally seized Adam and Eve from his 
family in the 1920s.95 In 1966, the Netherlands sold Adam and Eve to 
Mr. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff.96 In 1971, Mr. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff sold 
the Cranachs to the Norton Simon Museum.97
B. Procedural History of the Von Saher Litigation
In 2002, California’s state legislature enacted Section 354.3 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure entitled “Recovery of Holocaust-era 
artwork from enumerated entities.”98 The statute intended to open the 
courthouse doors to persons with restitution claims related to artwork 
misappropriated during the Holocaust and in the possession of mu-
seums and galleries located in or with sufficient jurisdictional contacts 
with the state.99 The statute provided relief from California’s three-year 
statute of limitations. Section 354.3 gave claimants until December 
30, 2010 to bring an action to recover “Holocaust-era artwork” taken 
as a result of Nazi expropriation.100
In May 2007, Ms. von Saher filed an action in federal district court 
in California for replevin, conversion, and damages under California 
Penal Code Section 496,101 requesting title to the Cranachs.102 The 
complaint alleged it was timely filed pursuant to California Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 354.3.103
95  Mr. Stroganoff-claimed that the Cranachs belonged to his family and that the Dutch 
government did not have any right, title or interest in them. Provenance shows the Cra-
nachs came from the Church of the Holy Trinity in Kiev and had never been part of the Stro-
ganoff family art collection. See Appellate Brief at 7, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum 
of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), 2008 WL 644327.
96  Id.
97  Amineddoleh, supra note 88.
98  cal. cIv. Proc. code § 354.3.
99  Id. § 354.3(c).
100  Id. §§ 354.3(a) (2) & (c).
101  cal. Penal code § 496.
102  See Appellate Brief at 6, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 
No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), 2008 WL 644327.
103  Acquaviva, supra note 88.
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The Norton Simon Museum, which is not a signatory to the AAM 
Guidelines,104 moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure Section 354.3 was unconstitutional as pre-
empted by the foreign affairs doctrine,105 under which the “power to deal 
with foreign affairs [is] a primarily, if not exclusively, federal power”.106 In 
October 2007, the district court granted Norton Simon Museum’s motion 
to dismiss the complaint in its entirety with prejudice.107 Additionally, the 
district court held Ms. von Saher’s claims to be untimely filed pursuant to 
the then-enacted California Code of Civil Procedure Section 338.108 Ms. 
von Saher appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.109
In August 2009, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded the case back to the district court. The Ninth Circuit 
held that California Code of Civil Procedure Section 354.3 was not 
preempted by the federal government’s policy of external restitution, 
as that policy ceased to exist in 1948.110 As such, Section 354.3 did 
not conflict with any current foreign policy.111 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed that Section 354.3 was preempted under the foreign 
104  See generally Find a Member Museum, Am. Alliance of Museums, http://www.aam-
us.org/about-museums/find-a-museum (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). As the Norton Si-
mon Museum was not a party to the AAM or the AAMD, and because the Guidelines are 
not legally binding, the museum freely chose not to waive any of its defenses and did 
so without penalty.
105  Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at 959-60.
106  Id. at 960; see also World Jewish Restitution Organization, supra note 67, at 42 
(“The Supreme Court has found state laws unconstitutional under the foreign affairs doc-
trine when the state laws directly conflict with an exercise of the federal government’s 
power to engage in foreign affairs, whether by treaty, federal statue, or express executive 
branch policy”). Effectively, the doctrine ensures that the federal government has the 
exclusive power to decide the country’s foreign affairs.
107  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Mu-
seum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 47.
108  cal. cIv. Proc. code § 338(c)(1). Section 338 is California’s general three-year 
statute of limitations governing “actions for specific recovery of personal property.”
109  Wolf, supra note 12, at 538; see also Brief of Appellant at 2, Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), 
ECF No. 48.
110  Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at 963 (“The United States’ authorities stopped accepting 
claims for external restitution of looted artwork as of September 15, 1948”).
111  Id.
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affairs doctrine, under the field preemption prong, since “the power 
to legislate restitution and reparation claims is one that has been ex-
clusively reserved to the national government by the Constitution”.112
The Ninth Circuit noted that the real purpose of the California sta-
tute was actually to create “a friendly forum for litigating Holocaust 
restitution claims, open to anyone in the world to sue a museum or 
gallery”.113 Since the creation of a worldwide forum for the resolution of 
Holocaust restitution claims did infringe on the federal government’s 
foreign policy powers, the Ninth Circuit ruled the California statute un-
constitutional.114 The Ninth Circuit held that Ms. von Saher’s complaint 
should not have been dismissed with prejudice and allowed Ms. von 
Saher leave to amend her complaint.115
Von Saher I demonstrates how states’ legislatures had limited powers 
to alter their statutes of limitations to protect victims of the Holocaust 
and their heirs who seek restitution for Nazi-looted art.116
In response to Von Saher I, the California legislature amended Section 
338(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure to extend the statute of 
limitations from three years to six years for claims concerning the reco-
very of fine art from museums, galleries, auctioneers or dealers in the 
case of an unlawful taking or theft.117 The newly enacted law was made 
retroactive and provided that the statute of limitations did not commen-
ce until the plaintiff actually discovers both the identity and location of 
the artwork.118 The amended Section 338(c) makes no reference to the 
Holocaust or its victims.119
112  Id. at 967.
113  Case Summary of Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, InternatIonal foun-
datIon of art research, https://www.ifar.org/case_summary.php?docid=1286569240 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
114  Wolf, supra note 12, at 539.
115  Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at 966-68, alteration in original (“California may not improve 
upon or add to the resolution of war”).
116  Id. at 969.
117  Assemb. B. No. 2765 § 2, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
118  Id.
119  See Legal Analysis, supra note 59, at 45-47. In Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza 
Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613, 617-19 (9th Cir. 2013) (comparing section 338(c) 
to section 354.3, the Ninth Circuit noted that section 338(c) did not explicitly create a 
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In April 2010, Ms. von Saher filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
with the United States Supreme Court.120 The Supreme Court denied the 
petition in June 2011.121
In November 2011, Ms. von Saher filed an amended complaint in 
the district court for restitution of the Cranachs, now under California 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 338(c), as amended.122 The district court 
dismissed the case for a second time, holding that California Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 354.3 was facially unconstitutional on the ba-
sis of the foreign affairs doctrine,123 cautioning that any exercise of sta-
te power that “touches on foreign relations must yield to the National 
Government’s policy, given the ‘concern for uniformity in this country’s 
dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s alloca-
tion of the foreign relations power to the National Government in the 
first place”.124 The district court reasoned that Section 354.3 intruded 
on the federal government’s executive power to make and resolve war, 
including the procedure for resolving war claims.125 The district court held 
that because foreign affairs are under the exclusive power of the federal 
government, the California statute of limitations was impeding executive 
power and was therefore unconstitutional.126
new cause of action to remedy wartime injuries and, therefore, there were no grounds 
to find preemption).
120  Von Saher II, 592 F.3d at 721, petition for cert. filed Apr. 12, 2010 (No. 09-1254), 
2010 WL 1557533.
121  Von Saher, 131 S. Ct. 3055, cert. denied June 27, 2011 (No. 09-1254).
122  Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 718-19.
123  See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has characterized the power to 
deal with foreign affairs as a primarily, if not exclusively, federal power. Indeed, the 
Constitution allocated the power over foreign affairs to the federal government exclu-
sively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the authority to resolve war 
claims, is central to the foreign affairs power in the constitutional design. In the ab-
sence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the part of the federal 
government, states are prohibited from exercising foreign affairs powers, including 
modifying the federal government’s resolution of war-related disputes” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
124  Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 719.
125  Von Saher I, 592 F.3d at 960.
126  Id.
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In October 2012, Ms. von Saher appealed to the Ninth Circuit for the 
second time in Von Saher II.127 In June 2014, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s order and remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings.128 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Cranachs had 
never been subject to any post-war internal restitution proceedings in the 
Netherlands, and, therefore, this matter was not preempted by the fore-
ign affairs doctrine.129 As such, Ms. von Saher’s claims would not “disturb 
the finality of any internal restitution proceedings —appropriate or not— 
in the Netherlands”.130 In addition, the Ninth Circuit instructed the district 
court to determine whether the Act of State Doctrine was implicated.131 
The Ninth Circuit was concerned that adjudication of the case might re-
quire an evaluation of the Dutch government’s decision to transfer the 
painting after the war. Such a decision would violate the Act of State 
Doctrine if it would require the court “to declare invalid the official act of 
a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory”.132
In July 2014, the Norton Simon Museum’s petition to the Ninth Cir-
cuit for rehearing was denied.133 In August 2014, the Norton Simon 
Museum filed a motion requesting the Ninth Circuit to stay its mandate 
pending the disposition of the Norton Simon Museum’s intended pe-
tition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.134 The 
Ninth Circuit granted the motion.135
127  See Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 712; see also Brief of Appellant at 1, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 
2015) (No. 12-55733), 2012 WL 4793678.
128  Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 721 (“Von Saher’s claims do not conflict with any federal 
policy because the Cranachs were never subject to postwar internal restitution proceed-
ings in the Netherlands...”); see also u.s. const. art. vI.
129  Wolf, supra note 12, at 543.
130  Id.
131  Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 719, 725. In the six previous years of litigation, the issue 
as to whether the Act of State Doctrine might be implicated had never been presented.
132  Id. at 725.
133  See Order at 1, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-
02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 57.
134  See Unopposed Motion for Stay of Mandate Pending Disposition of a Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari of Defendants-Appellees at 1, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of 
Art at Pasadena, No. CV 07-2866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 99.
135  See Order at 1, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-
02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 99.
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In November 2014, the Norton Simon Museum filed its petition for 
writ of certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision.136 In January 2015, after both sides had submitted their briefs, 
the Supreme Court denied the petition.137 The Supreme Court remanded 
Von Saher II to the district court, which had been directed by the Ninth 
Circuit to consider the implications of the Act of State Doctrine arising 
from the 1966 sale of the Cranachs.138
The district court case was set for trial in September 2016. On June 
13, 2016, the Norton Simon Museum filed a motion for summary jud-
gment, and on August 15, 2016, the district court ruled that because 
Mrs. Goudstikker did not file a claim for the return of the Cranachs 
prior to the 1951 deadline, the works became Dutch property, and 
any subsequent transfers by the Dutch government would thus convey 
legal title.139 Therefore, Mr. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff acquired legal title 
to the Cranachs when he acquired title from the Dutch government 
in 1966 and then passed legal title to the Norton Simon Museum in 
1971.140 The district court further held that the museum was sole ow-
ner of the title to the Cranachs, and that Ms. von Saher had no right, 
title, or interest whatsoever in the Cranachs,141 and that no person 
had any right, title or interest in the Cranachs that is superior or ad-
verse to the Norton Simon Museum’s title.142 The district court further 
ordered that Ms. von Saher take nothing, the action be dismissed in 
its entirety with prejudice, and the Norton Simon Museum recover its 
costs of court.143
Ms. von Saher has again appealed to the Ninth Circuit; briefs are to 
be submitted in March 2017.144
136  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 
Pasadena, No. 07-CV-02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), 135 S. Ct. 1158 (2015).
137  Von Saher II, 754 F.3d 712, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1158 (2015).
138  Wolf, supra note 12, at 547.
139  See Order at 2, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-CV-
02866-JFW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015), ECF No. 333.




144  Case Summary, supra note 113.
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C. Analysis of Von Saher and the United States’ Judicial 
System’s Failure to Apply“Just and Fair” Solutions
Von Saher I and II illustrate what enormous obstacles claimants may 
face. It took nine years of hard-fought litigation, including two trips to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and two petitions 
for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, as well as the 
enactment of two different statutes by the California legislature, for Ms. 
von Saher to have the courthouse doors remain open for her and for the 
federal courts to hear the merits of her claim for restitution.
Von Saher is an example of the burdens placed on claimants when 
they seek restitution of their art, and how insurmountable and daun-
ting the burdens can be. Further, Von Saher exemplifies how before the 
HEAR Act passed, states’ statutes of limitations could not be modified 
to protect Holocaust restitution claimants, and those claims rarely sur-
vived a motion to dismiss. Now that there is a federal statute ensuring 
an available forum, if the objective to ensure adjudication on the merits 
is to be met, there needs to be a clear and definitive commitment by 
the entire museum community that it will waive the use of time-based 
affirmative defenses.145
Part III
A. Background and Procedural History of the HEAR Act
The HEAR Act, S. 2763,146 was introduced to the Senate on April 7, 
2016 by Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX),147 Sena-
tor Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), as 
145  See World Jewish Restitution Organization, supra note 67, at 51.
146  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2016).
147  Marc Masurovsky, S. 2763: Restitution Kabuki, Plundered art Blog (June 15, 2016, 
8:16 PM), http://plundered-art.blogspot.com/2016/06/s-2763-restitution-kabuki.html. 
Neither Senator Cornyn nor Senator Cruz has been known to utter a word or express a 
single public thought about holocaust claimants or Nazi looted art.
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cosponsors of the bill. The bill passed unanimously out of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on September 15, 2016.148 House Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Congressman Jerrold Nadler 
(D-NY) subsequently introduced the legislation, H.R. 6130, in the Hou-
se of Representatives.149 On December 7, 2016, the bill passed una-
nimously by a voice vote.150 On December 16, 2016, President Obama 
signed the HEAR Act into law.151
The HEAR Act allows claimants to file claims in federal court to re-
cover artwork or other cultural property unlawfully lost during the Nazi 
era, or for damages for the taking or detaining of such artwork or cul-
tural property.152 The HEAR Act establishes a uniform federal statute of 
limitations for all claims that arise in the United States, preempting all 
other state or federal statutes of limitations or defenses relating to the 
passage of time.153
The HEAR Act allows claims commenced within the six years154 fo-
llowing the claimant’s actual discovery155 of the identity and location of 
the artwork or cultural property and information or facts sufficient to 
indicate that the claimant has a claim for a possessory interest in the 
artwork or cultural property that was unlawfully lost. In other words, a 
claim to an artwork of which someone has knowledge of today but for 
which a demand has not been made, or a claim which was filed fewer 
148  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2016).
149  Press Release, Congressman Jerrold Nadler, Nadler and Goodlatte Praise House 
Passage of Bill to Recover Art Stolen During the Holocaust (Dec. 7, 2016) (on file with 
author).
150  Id.
151  President Obama Signs Law to Aid Recovery of Nazi-Looted Art, Pr neWsWIre (Dec 19, 
2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/president-obama-signs-law-
to-aid-recovery-of-nazi-looted-art-300381587.html?tc=eml_cleartime.
152  S. Res. 2763, 114th Cong. § 4(5) (2016).
153  S. Res. 2763, 114th Cong. § 5(c)(2)(B).
154  Id. at § 5(a).
155  Id. at § 4(1); see also Nicholas O’Donnell, Restitution Legislation: HEAR Act and 
Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act Move Forward, art laW re-
Port Blog (Sept. 18, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://blog.sandw.com/artlawreport/restitution-
legislation-hear-act-and-foreign-cultural-exchange-jurisdictional-clarification-act-move-
forward.
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than three years ago, would not constitute the work being “discovered” 
and the claim is now only subject to the new six-year limitations period. 
The six-year period could be interpreted as a last opportunity to file a 
claim for restitution, that is assuming the claimant currently knows whe-
re their object is and has the funds available to pursue the litigation.156
The HEAR Act applies to claims or causes of action that are currently 
pending or filed after December 16, 2016,157 but before January 1, 
2027.158 Such claims may include those that were dismissed before 
enactment of the HEAR Act based on the expiration of a federal or state 
statute of limitations or any other defense at law or in equity relating to 
the passage of time, as well as claims in which a final judgment has not 
been entered.159
The HEAR Act’s purported goal is to ensure that Holocaust victims 
and their heirs are afforded an opportunity to have their cases heard 
on the merits.160 The language of the HEAR Act affirms that United 
States policy encompasses both the Terezin Declaration161 and the 
Washington Conference principles.162 However, the reality is the HEAR 
Act favors only wealthy claimants with access to significant means to 
support research into their claims and legal action to recover identified 
objects which sit in public or private collections. It is not designed to 
help the vast majority of claimants who lost cultural assets that are 
not museum-worthy. The HEAR Act ultimately does not provide a clai-
156  Masurovsky, supra note 147.
157  S. Res. 2763, 114th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(2).
158  Id. at § 5(d)(2).
159  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2016).
160  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016: Hearing on S. 2763 Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights & Federal Courts, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (statement of Ronald S. Lauder, President of World Jewish Congress).
161  See Press Release, supra 59, at 7. In 2009, the United States and 47 other coun-
tries endorsed the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Restated Issues (the 
“Terezin Declaration”). In addition to endorsing the Washington Conference principles, 
the Terezin Declaration encourages public and private institutions to apply those prin-
ciples and work to “facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and 
looted art, and to make certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously 
based on the facts and merits of the claims”.
162  PR Newswire, supra note 151.
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mant their “fair day in court” where their claim may be assessed solely 
on its merits.163
The HEAR Act will not oblige American museums to live up to the 
AAM and AAMD Guidelines for Nazi-era looted art, which are often 
flouted, nor will it require any foreign signatory to the Washington Con-
ference principles to refrain from asserting an affirmative defense ba-
sed on limitations, as they often do, despite their commitments to the 
contrary.164 It is evident that the framers of the legislation did not consi-
der reparation or restitution to be the preeminent outcomes.
B. The Applicability of Equitable Principles
The underlying rationale for waiving limitations defense, or applying Ci-
vil Law, where applicable, is to allow Holocaust victims and their heirs 
a greater opportunity to obtain relief in the federal courts by the appli-
cation of equitable principles over legal precedents. The assertion that 
courts apply equitable principles is not revolutionary and has been urged 
since at least the 1500s, most notably, in a literary context, by Shakes-
peare in The Merchant of Venice.165 In The Merchant of Venice, Portia (a 
lawyer) appears before the court and argues on the qualities of mercy 
and mankind’s capacity for a higher, divinely inspired form of law.166 Por-
tia argues the inequity of a system which adopts the letter of the law in 
violation of human rights is not the best option, and is a forceful argu-
ment for the court to apply equitable principles. A more recent argument 
for the application of equitable principles is made in Brown v. Board of 
Education II.167 In Brown II, Chief Justice Warren wrote that to fully as-
163  Masurovsky, supra note 147.
164  O’Donnell, supra note 155, at 2.
165  WIllIam shakesPeare, the merchant of venIce, 1599.
166  “But mercy is above this sceptred sway; It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, It is 
an attribute to God himself; And earthly power doth then show likest God’s When mercy 
seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That, in the 
course of justice, none of us Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; And that same 
prayer doth teach us all to render The deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much To miti-
gate the justice of thy plea; Which if thou follow, this strict court of Venice Must needs 
give sentence ‘gainst the merchant there.” Id. the fourth act, sc. 2.
167  Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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sess the effects of the desegregation decrees, the courts must be gui-
ded by equitable principles, stating:
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility 
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these 
traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of 
the plaintiffs... To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a 
variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems opera-
ted in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in Brown 
I. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest 
in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective 
manner.168
Judges should follow Justice Warren’s example of applying equitable 
principles to future claims. Courts should be able to swiftly adjudicate 
the merits in Nazi-era looted art cases. Courts have the inherent power 
to balance the public’s interest in these artworks (if they are publicly 
displayed) versus the original owner’s family’s private interest in regai-
ning the family’s property or cultural artifact that had been taken by the 
Nazis. Through each looted-art claim, American courts can hold Euro-
pean institutions and private entities accountable for their participation 
in Nazi crimes.169 In this way, through the recovery of some of the world’s 
most celebrated art, justice can be served.
The Washington Conference originally claimed that “moral autho-
rity... is probably more effective than the threat of civil or criminal 
proceedings”.170 Unfortunately, as is now evident, it is precisely this lack 
of enforcement that has led to the failure of the Washington Conference 
principles. Although an enforcement mechanism based on moral autho-
rity can have a positive effect, it is apparent that to induce both private 
parties and governments to act forthrightly there must be the specter of 
punishment under law.171
168  Id.
169  Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1176.
170  Mullery, supra note 9, at 659.
171  Id.
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Part IV
A. The Importance of Congress’s Involvement
Throughout Von Saher it became clear that Congress needed to step in 
and create a national statute of limitations to be used in Nazi-era res-
titution cases. Congress and not the judiciary is far better equipped to 
“amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing upon the compli-
cated issues presented in Nazi-era restitution cases.172 It is the values 
set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland173 that the United States Supreme 
Court recognized and continues to value the superior qualities of Con-
gress to make policy decisions given its “capacity to avail itself of 
experience, to exercise its reason and to accommodate its legislation 
to circumstances”.174 Since McCulloch, the Supreme Court has noted 
that when complex circumstances present a question of policy, “[t]he 
selection of that policy which is most advantageous to the whole invol-
ves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That 
function is more appropriate for those who write the laws, rather than 
those who interpret them”.175 Because Nazi-era looted art restitution 
cases are of high emotion wrapped up in controversy, they demand a 
rule-making procedure that, in many ways, transcends the facts of any 
one specific case.176
Congress has both a superior institutional capacity to collect the 
necessary evidence, and the fact-finding abilities to recognize the uni-
172  Cuba, supra note 2, at 451.
173  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
174  Id.
175  Cuba, supra note 2, at 451 (citing United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512-13 
(1954)); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981) 
(noting that the just resolution in complex cases with a wide range of factors, which ap-
ply not only to a particular case, is inappropriate for judicial resolution and should be ad-
dressed by Congress); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1980) (noting 
legislative competence to investigate, research and examine where the courts cannot); 
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972) (noting the ability of 
Congress to weigh the myriad of factors and interests in economic issues).
176  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 112.
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que and complex circumstances involving Nazi-era looted art.177 Such 
superior investigative abilities give Congress the power to create reme-
dies far exceeding those available to the courts. The Nazi-era looted 
art cases demanded federal legislative action since they presented a 
difficult policy choice between two competing interests: victims of Nazi-
era looting and the good faith purchasers of the artwork.178 It was for 
Congress, not the judiciary, to make relative value judgments taking into 
consideration economic concerns and balancing competing interests.179
Moreover, the facts in many Nazi-era looted art cases are similar 
to one another and should be given the same considerations. “[I]t is 
when courts have been unable to agree as to the exact relevance of a 
frequently occurring fact in an atmosphere pregnant with illegality that 
Congress’ resolution is appropriate”.180 Further, while a court’s decision 
only impacts the parties to the dispute, Congress is able to enact a 
broadly applicable rule, which affects a large class of people.181
Lastly, Congress’s political accountability made it the proper branch of 
government to make a policy choice in these cases.182 Should the federal 
courts usurp policymaking authority, “the legislative process with its pu-
blic scrutiny and participation [would be] bypassed…”.183 Since the fede-
ral courts are “free to reach a result different from that which the normal 
play of political forces would have produced,” the intended beneficiaries 
of legislation lose protection and are “denied the benefits that are derived 
177  Cuba, supra note 2, at 451 (noting Congress’s capacity comes from the significant 
resources available to the legislatures, namely their special committees, personal staff 
members, legislative hearings, etc.).
178  Id. at 452.
179  Id.
180  United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
181  Cuba, supra note 2, at 452.
182  Id.; see also the federalIst no. 49 at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). The Framers intended that each of the three branches have a specialized role. 
Congress, due to its high degree of representativeness and accountability, will best un-
derstand the “passions” of the electorate, suiting it best to make policy choices. The 
completely insulated, life tenured, federal judiciary will have “neither FORCE nor WILL 
but merely judgment…”.
183  Cuba, supra note 2, at 452 (citing Cannon v. University of Cal., 441 U.S. 677, 743 
(1979)).
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from the making of important societal choices through the open debate 
of the democratic process”.184
B. Congress’s Two Options to Provide a Workable Solution: 
The Discovery Rule versus the Demand and Refusal Rule
Any claim for the recovery of Nazi-era looted art in the United States is 
predicated on a fundamental rule: no one, not even a good faith purcha-
ser can obtain good title to stolen property.185 This uncomplicated rule is 
accepted and applied as a basic tenet of common-law property law.186 
The owner of stolen property has the right to reclaim that property from 
anyone, unless barred by the statute of limitations or similar doctrines.187
The kinds of limitations rules applied in art restitution cases can ge-
nerally be broken down into two categories: the Discovery Rule and the 
Demand and Refusal Rule.188 Both rules are premised on judicial cogni-
zance of the need to treat art differently. The courts that have addres-
sed the issue have found it necessary to deviate from both a rule that 
favors original owners exclusively and a strict application of the doctrine 
of adverse possession of chattels, which is often used in conjunction 
with a legislated statute of limitations. Both modifications are attempts 
to recognize the mobility, concealability and financial value of art, while 
balancing the interests of both the original owner and the subsequent 
good faith purchaser.189
Historically, legislatures have left it to the courts’ discretion to decide 
when accrual occurs.190 Most states previously followed the “Discovery 
Rule”,191 established by the seminal case of O’Keeffe v. Snyder.192 “The 
184  Id.
185  Kaye, supra note 33, at 252.
186  Id.
187  Id.
188  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 105, 121 (“Theoretically, under the Demand and 
Refusal Rule, a claim by a would-be plaintiff is just as fresh 50 years later as it would be 
the day it was stolen”).
189  Id.
190  “A cause of action ‘accrues’ when a suit may be maintained thereon...” Black’s laW 
dIctIonary 20 (6th ed. 1990).
191  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 107.
192  416 A.3d 862 (N.J. 1980).
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Discovery Rule provides that, in an appropriate case, a cause of action 
will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of rea-
sonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which 
form the basis for a cause of action”.193 The statute of limitations, 
therefore, begins to run once the true owner knows or should have 
known the correct person or institution to bring a claim against, and 
that person or institution is the current possessor of the art.194 This rule 
requires the original owners to pursue their missing work diligently.195 
Under the Discovery Rule the burden is on the owner (the one seeking 
the benefit of the rule) to establish facts that would justify deferring the 
beginning of the period of limitations.196 This rule applies in the case 
of an innocent third-party purchaser of stolen property, meaning that 
an original owner may still not be time-barred from bringing suit, so 
long as the action is brought within three years of his discovery of the 
artwork or the possessor.197 Thus, the original owner may often times 
end up bringing claims decades after the date of appropriation.198 The 
reasoning behind the Discovery Rule is that the plaintiff must proacti-
vely search for the artwork and defendants must not only show that they 
purchased the artwork in good faith, but must also make their posses-
sion known to the general public.199
The Demand and Refusal Rule,200 followed in New York, states that the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the original owner demands re-
turn of the artwork but is refused by the current possessor or good faith 
purchaser.201 In contrast to the Discovery Rule, application of this rule 
allows the original owner more time to find the good faith purchaser, and 
193  O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
194  Graefe, supra note 63, at 482.
195  Id. at 483.
196  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 108.
197  Choi, supra note 1, at 194.
198  Id.
199  Id.
200  The Demand and Refusal Rule originated in Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), rev’d on other 
grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
201  See Stephen A. Bibas, The Case Against the Statute of Limitations for Stolen Art, 
103 yale l.J. 2437, 2446 (1994).
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thus gives the original owner the most protection.202 Some critics compa-
re the Demand and Refusal Rule to basically having no statute of limita-
tions at all.203 Many cases are won or dismissed on the interpretation of 
the statute of limitations alone, and a court will often spend years adju-
dicating that one issue.204
C. Why the Demand and Refusal Rule 
was Correctly Adopted by Congress
The New York Demand and Refusal Rule is superior to the Discovery 
Rule. Early critics were fearful that the HEAR Act would adopt the Disco-
very Rule and thus limit future claimants. However, the HEAR Act crea-
tes a legal fiction that the date of “discovery” will be deemed to be the 
date of enactment of the law if:
(A) before the date of enactment of this Act, a claimant had knowled-
ge of the elements set forth in subsection (a); and (B) on the date of 
enactment of this Act, the civil claim or cause of action was not barred 
by a Federal or State statute of limitations.205
In other words, a claim of which someone has knowledge of today 
but has not made demand and refusal, or did so fewer than three years 
ago, would not have been “discovered” and subject to the new six year 
limitations period until the law was passed.206 If three years from de-
mand and refusal runs (or ran) before the law was enacted, however, 
the statute will not revive it.207
202  Id.
203  Id.
204  Cuba, supra note 2, at 455; see, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev’d, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
rev’d, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (spending 13 
years addressing the complexities of the statute of limitations); Kunstsammlungen zu 
Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 
1982) (spending eight years determining issues related to statute of limitations).
205  Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2016).
206  O’Donnell, supra note 155.
207  Id.
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The type of statute of limitation the court applies is crucial when dea-
ling with Nazi-era looted art because United States’ common law does 
not allow good title to pass to stolen works of art until the statute of 
limitations on the initial theft expires.208 Because the original owner can 
prevail on a claim if theft is shown, the good faith purchaser is only pro-
tected if the statute of limitations bars the claim.209 In most cases, the 
original owners are not able to locate the stolen artwork until the statu-
te of limitations has run on their claim. Thus, the statute of limitations 
historically serves as the defendant’s primary defense.210
D. None of the Original Policy Goals of Statutes of Limitations 
are Met in Nazi-Era Looted Art Cases
The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is fairness to the defen-
dant.211 A defendant should reasonably expect that “the slate has been 
wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to 
resist a claim where the evidence has been lost, memories have faded, 
and witnesses have disappeared”.212 Further, the limitations period “re-
flects a value judgment concerning the point at which interests in favor 
of protecting valid claims are outweighed by interest in prohibiting the 
prosecution of stale ones”.213 However, in Holocaust-era cases, the clai-
mants are frequently the survivors or their children who are unable to 
bring claims for restitution within the short statute of limitations period 
because of the unique challenges faced in attempting to determine the 
provenance of the art.214 Almost every time a claimant has come forward, 
and a museum asserted a statute of limitations defense under state law, 
the museum has successfully defeated the claims.215
208  Graefe, supra note 63, at 481.
209  Id.
210  Choi, supra note 1, at 197.
211  Id.
212  Id.
213  Legal Analysis, supra note 59, at 17.
214  Id.
215  Id. at 16.
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The prospect of time-consuming, combative, and expensive litigation 
with museums over statutes of limitations and other defenses undoub-
tedly has deterred claimants from coming forward and pursing claims for 
restitution.216 It is impossible to quantify how many claims would have 
been asserted but for those daunting obstacles.217 One can reasonably 
conclude that the resort to limitations defenses by museums has had 
a chilling effect on potential claimants and has given the museums the 
upper hand, even in private negotiations and mediations. It can certainly 
be said that United States’ museums have used limitations defenses to 
impose costs and burdens on claimants and to avoid having to adjudicate 
claims to Nazi-era looted art on the facts and merits.218
E. What Effect Will the HEAR Act Have 
on Von Saher’s Third Appeal?
The HEAR Act cites Von Saher’s invalidation of California Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 354.3 as the reason to create a new federal statute 
of limitations.219 However, the HEAR Act would not have changed the 
result in Von Saher I or II, nor will it have any effect on Von Saher’s con-
tinuing litigation.220
As Von Saher was not dismissed as a result of a statute of limitations 
defense, it is unlikely the HEAR Act will help Ms. von Saher gain title to 
her family’s artwork. However, the HEAR Act may provide some effec-
tive help in Von Saher’s forthcoming appeal, as under the HEAR Act 
claims are to be fairly adjudicated although, as of yet, the Norton Simon 
Museum has not been sanctioned for previously violating ethical stan-
dards. Thus, it is doubtful that the HEAR Act could be enforced against 
the museum now, and if the museum were to violate ethical standards 
again, there is no legislative body that will see to the enforcement of 
sanctions.
216  Id. at 37.
217  Id. at 38.
218  Id.
219  S. Res. 2763, 114th Cong. § 2(7).
220  Id.
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Proposed Amendments to the HEAR Act
As currently enacted, the HEAR Act expires on December 31, 2026. If a 
claimant files a claim after this date in New York or in another jurisdic-
tion that relies on the statute of limitations rule defined in New York, it 
is almost certain that defendants will challenge this claim as adversely 
affected by the legislative history of the HEAR Act, which already inclu-
des the statement made by Senator Cornyn during the hearings that 
“the ability to find art is better now and claimants should be given a 
chance, but that chance should not last forever”.221
Proposed amendment 1: Section 5 of the legislation be amended to 
state that upon the expiration of this Act, all statute of limitations rules 
in existence prior to the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect, and 
after December 2026, a claimant should not be barred from bringing a 
claim or cause of action under the statute of limitations rules in existen-
ce prior to the enactment of the HEAR Act.
Proposed amendment 2: Amend the HEAR Act to specifically bar 
defendants from invoking the laches defense. Since the laches defen-
se can be applied on a discretionary basis by a judge regardless of a 
statute of limitations defense, the defense can defeat the congressio-
nal intent to entertain claims on their merits. In order to achieve the 
legislative intent of allowing claims to be decided only on their merits, 
laches defenses should be barred, at the very least until the advent of 
the sunset provision.
Proposed amendment 3: Amend the HEAR Act so the AAM actively 
monitors and regulates its member museums. The AAM Accreditation 
Commission should consider the accreditation status of museums that 
violate museum standards and ethics in handling claims for looted art, 
and if a museum is found in violation of the standard of ethics, the 
221  Letter from Pierre Ciric, Director of Holocaust Art Restitution Project, Inc. to Mem-
bers of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Fed-
eral Courts, June 14, 2016.
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museum should lose its accreditation or face a serious penalty.222 This 
could be a possible solution to hold museums accountable and not 
allow free reign by museum directors. If the AAM is to continue to be 
a self-regulating body, it must abide by its own codes in regulating and 
monitoring its museums and enforcing ethical standards.223
4. Conclusion
The United States State Department becomes increasingly relevant in 
Nazi-era looted art cases that involve foreign nations since the claims 
are closely tied to Holocaust experiences, and monetary compensation 
is not always the result a claimant is willing to consider.224 Concern over 
soured foreign relations and barriers to restitution due to litigation are 
valid with cases such as Republic of Austria v. Altmann225 serving as an 
archetype.226 Portrait of Wally227 raised similar international concerns, 
222  World Jewish Restitution Organization, supra note 67, at 7.
223  Id. at 10.
224  Mullery, supra note 9, at 661.
225  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
226  Mullery, supra note 9, at 661; see also Marilyn Henry, Talking Looted Art, Jerusalem 
Post, Aug. 23, 2008, at 14, available at http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Met-
ro-Views-Talking-looted-art. (Noting that it is unlikely that Austria wants to deal with res-
titution again post-Altmann. It is estimated that the Austrian Gallery stood to lose $300 
million due to loss of the artworks, and also loss of revenue due to declined tourism).
227  United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also 
Katharine N. Skinner, Restitution Nazi-Looted Art: Domestic, Legislative, and Binding 
Intervention to Balance the Interests of Victims and Museums, 15 vand. J. ent. & tech. 
l. 673, 710 (2013). In 1997, MoMA exhibited a painting on loan from the Austrian 
Leopold museum. The painting (“Wally”) had a long and tangled history of ownership, 
and the estate of its 1930s Austrian-Jewish owners asserted that the painting had either 
been stolen by the Nazis or granted to them under duress when their ancestor fled the 
country to avoid persecution. After the MoMA exhibit ended, the New York District At-
torney’s Office issued a subpoena for the painting, claiming that the Leopold Museum 
had violated the National Stolen Property Act by knowingly shipping a stolen artifact into 
the United States. The court, after many years of litigation, ruled that a triable issue of 
fact existed as to whether the Leopold knew that “Wally” had been stolen, and therefore 
knew its illegal status when exporting it to the United States. Before a jury could resolve 
the issue, the two parties settled. The painting was eventually returned to the Leopold 
after the museum paid the heirs $19 million.
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specifically among museums seeking to loan artwork from foreign co-
llectors and galleries.228
Passion for art should not displace respect for justice. If museums are 
not held to any kind of standard the whole restitution process continues 
to be a sham because, at the end of the day, everyone continues to pro-
fit from the theft except the victim.
Nazi-era looted art restitution claims represent more than the theft of 
a particular family’s private collection —they instead symbolize the pro-
found depths of the Nazis’ crimes against humanity. The equitable reso-
lution of claims for restitution of Nazi-era looted art would be beneficial 
to all concerned. The effective resolution of restitution claims will provide 
justice and equity and, at the same time, in small measure, right odious 
crimes against humanity.229 If nothing is done, the trade in stolen art will 
continue to flourish under the art market’s current practices, and mu-
seums will continue to avoid living up to ethical standards.230
Revista de Derecho Privado, Cuarta Época, 
año IV, núm. 12, julio-diciembre 2017
228  Mullery, supra note 9, at 661.
229  Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1153.
230  Schlegelmilch, supra note 31, at 96.
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